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Abstract
We extend a standard model of international risk sharing to include an empirically plausible
distortion: Taxes. The tax-inclusive theory implies, even under full risk sharing, a predictable
relationship between consumption growth and the consumption and capital income tax rates,
both within and across countries. We find strong empirical evidence in favor of this relation-
ship. While idiosyncratic output fluctuations account for substantially more of cross-country
consumption growth variability than do taxes, trends in tax differentials are found to be infor-
mative about the dynamic evolution of international risk sharing. In particular, adjusting for
capital taxes reveals a marked improvement in risk sharing over the last three decades that is
absent in baseline measures. This improvement has been driven by the convergence of average
tax rates on capital income across OECD countries towards the United States average capital
tax rate.
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1 Introduction
A central theoretical prediction of the benchmark international business cycle (IBC) model (Backus
et al., 1992) is that risk sharing between countries should be substantial. Furthermore, this interna-
tional risk sharing should manifest itself through equalization of consumption growth rates across
countries. Empirically though, as is well known, consumption growth rates across countries are
generally far from being equal. As shown in Table 1, at yearly frequency, cross-country corre-
lations between growth rates of per capita consumption vary from -0.05 to 0.8, with a mean of
0.42.1 Within the context of the benchmark IBC model, this correlation-based evidence points to-
ward a general lack of risk sharing, which is also present at quarterly frequency (see Backus et al.,
1992; Chari et al., 2002, among many others). The related prediction that the growth rate of the
marginal utility of consumption should not be influenced by country-specific risks is also rejected
by the data (Lewis, 1996). Numerous modifications of the benchmark IBC model have been put
forward to address this puzzle, with varying degrees of success.
In this paper we revisit the puzzle of empirically low risk sharing by considering a very simple
modification to the benchmark IBC model: accounting for taxes on consumption expenditure and
capital income. We show that taxes act as a distortion in international financial markets that
potentially undermine the true explanatory power of the frictionless benchmark theory. Such a
distortion relative to a benchmark model’s implications has more recently been coined as a “wedge”
in the macroeconomics literature (see, for example, Chari et al., 2007; Prescott, 2004; Ohanian et al.,
2008; McDaniel, 2011). Taxes are attractive candidates for such wedges because they are observable
and quantifiable, as compared to other black box frictions. We are the first to operationalize the
implications of consumption and capital tax wedges for international risk sharing given recently
developed time series data on taxes as well as novel time series data on bilateral financial integration.
In particular, we use a mix of theory and empirical analysis to address the following question: Do
cross-country differences, long run trends, and business cycle frequency fluctuations in consumption
and capital taxes matter, and if so, in what way, for understanding international risk sharing or its
failure?
The answer to this question is important, as there are intuitive reasons suggesting that account-
ing for taxes might shed light on the benchmark IBC model’s noted empirical anomalies. A simple
example with consumption taxes illustrates this point.2 International risk sharing is about keeping
the ratio of the marginal value of resources constant across countries. In standard models, the ratio
of marginal values are proportional to the ratio of consumption growth, so for these models perfect
risk sharing implies that consumption growth should be equalized across countries. But standard
models do not incorporate taxes. Suppose that country A experiences a reduction in consumption
1The OECD data used to construct this table span the years 1960 through 2010, and are described later in the
paper.
2We thank Fabrizio Perri for phrasing this example.
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taxes. This reduction in taxes increases the marginal value of transferring resources to country A,
so perfect risk sharing would imply that country A should experience faster consumption growth
than its partners. To an economist who does not consider taxes, this idiosyncratic variation in
consumption growth rates would appear as a violation of risk sharing. But when taxes are consid-
ered, this idiosyncratic variation in fact represents quite the opposite: It is the efficient response of
international capital flows to a variation in fundamentals (taxes).
Our analysis shows that introducing taxes into the standard IBC framework of Backus et al.
(1992) implies that international risk sharing is reflected by a monotonic relationship between in-
ternational consumption growth, consumption taxes, and capital taxes instead of the usual equal-
ization of consumption growth rates across countries. This monotone relationship is a simple
consequence of proportional taxes affecting a model’s optimality conditions. Intuitively, differences
in consumption taxes affect the implicit relative prices of consumption across countries even in
simple environments where the real exchange rate would otherwise be unity, while differences in
asset income taxes create incentives to deviate from perfect insurance. Our model has testable
implications that we bring to the data.3 Note that any exploration of international risk sharing
and taxes, especially capital taxes, must by necessity also take into account the role of international
financial integration.4 Thus, empirical measures of the degree of multilateral and bilateral financial
integration of countries play a central role in our analysis.
Our analysis yields three main results. The first of these results obtains from relating our
tax-inclusive model’s implications to regression-based tests of international risk-sharing a` la Lewis
(1996), which essentially run a horse race between taxes and country idiosyncratic risk, where risk
is proxied by per capita GDP growth. In the data, as implied by the model, there is a statistically
and economically significant relationship between consumption growth rates and consumption and
capital taxes. In particular: An increase in a country’s relative consumption tax growth and/or
relative capital income tax growth reduces that country’s relative consumption growth. Yet, taxes
alone cannot explain the extent to which consumption growth rates are not equalized across coun-
tries since macroeconomic aggregates, proxied by per capita GDP growth, explain substantially
more of the variance of per capita consumption growth than do taxes.
Second, from the perspective of a business cycle accounting framework (see, for example, Chari
et al., 2007), we introduce a novel measure of the degree of international risk sharing at any point
in time in the form of a risk-sharing wedge. We define risk-sharing wedges as the extent to which
3We use a panel of 15 OECD countries for the period 1960-2010 using: yearly tax data from McDaniel (2009) on
consumption and capital taxes; yearly consumption and working-age population (ages 15-64) data from the OECD;
and yearly empirical measures of financial integration, amongst which stand out a novel one that we construct using
confidential data from the Bank of International Settlements.
4A large theoretical literature suggests that tax rates on mobile factors such as capital should be related to financial
integration due to tax competition between countries. Conversely, Coeurdacier (2009) shows that taxes on capital
income can to some extent explain (the lack of) financial cross-holdings between countries, which is an often-used
measure of de facto financial integration. Thus, financial integration may be an omitted variable that drives both
risk sharing and tax rates, especially on capital.
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consumption growth rates across countries are not equalized, including or excluding taxes. We
then argue that the inclusion of consumption and capital taxes in such a wedge provides a clearer
evaluation of how international risk sharing has evolved over time compared to a baseline wedge
that does not take these taxes into account. Indeed, accounting for taxes suggests that risk sharing
has increased over time broadly in line with increases in financial integration. Yet, absent taxes,
when brought to the data the baseline risk-sharing prediction from IBC models tends to suggest,
unintuitively, no notable relationship between risk sharing and financial integration. We show
that this trend behavior of the level of risk sharing, i.e., the risk-sharing wedge, is driven by the
convergence of the levels of capital taxes in our sample of OECD countries to that of the United
States.
Third, motivated by this trend behavior of our tax-inclusive risk-sharing wedge, we explore the
evolution of capital tax rates across the world and relate it to the process of financial integration
that has occurred over the last several decades. We find that while most countries’ capital tax rates
have converged to that of the United States, the tax rate differentials between these other countries
have remained roughly constant. As such, our analysis suggests that the United States has acted
as a Stackelberg leader in the setting of capital taxes, with most other countries taking the role of
followers. This, in turn, has driven cross-country convergence (towards better risk sharing with the
United States) in the tax-inclusive model’s implied measure of risk sharing. Our estimates suggest
that the median country in our sample experienced a decline of approximately 5.4 percentage points
in its capital tax rate differential with the United States over the years 1970-2010 as a result of the
process of financial integration. Concurrently, the tax-inclusive risk-sharing wedge for the median
country vis-a`-vis the United States declined by approximately 7.4 percentage points. In comparison,
the baseline risk-sharing wedge that does not take taxes into account declined only 1.8 percentage
points in the same period. Thus adjusting for consumption and capital taxes, especially the latter,
indicates an improvement in risk sharing that is roughly 4 times larger than the baseline case.
This paper brings together three broad strands of literature in international finance, macroe-
conomics, and public finance. The first pertains to international consumption risk sharing. The
second is related to taxes as wedges in business cycles models. And the third is the literature
at the confluence of macroeconomics and public finance that deals with optimal taxation in open
economies. By introducing a novel measure of risk sharing in the form of a wedge, and relating its
evolution to broad trends in capital taxes across the world, we integrate these three strands that
have, quite surprisingly, remained separate until now.
The first strand of literature is exemplified by papers such as Backus et al. (1992, 1994), Backus
and Smith (1993), Baxter and Crucini (1995), Stockman and Tesar (1995), Chari et al. (2002),
Kehoe and Perri (2002), and Corsetti et al. (2008), among many others, that has sought theoretical
explanations for the risk-sharing puzzle.5 In the context of this literature, our results should be
5Artis and Hoffmann (2008) provide an excellent survey. The main conclusion of this literature is that the
consumption correlation anomaly is notoriously difficult to solve in the absence of enforcement frictions in international
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interpreted as evidence that theoretical models that rely on fluctuations in average tax rates, or fiscal
factors in general, are unlikely to provide a complete resolution to the consumption risk-sharing
puzzle. At the same time, accounting for consumption and capital taxes is indeed important for
arriving at a correct metric against which the relative success or failure of any one explanation for
the risk-sharing puzzle should be compared.
As related to the second strand of literature, labor taxes have recently been considered as a
possible reason for the marginal product of labor differing from the marginal rate of substitution
of consumption for leisure at any given point in time, i.e., the labor wedge (for instance, Prescott,
2004; Ohanian et al., 2008; McDaniel, 2011). In a recent contribution, Karabarbounis (2014b)
shows that when parameters of a home production sector are estimated to generate tax-adjusted
labor wedges that mimic their empirical counterparts, the standard IBC model with complete asset
markets can match some key stylized facts of the data, including that output is more correlated
than consumption across countries. Our analysis of the role of consumption and capital taxes in
consumption risk-sharing, which uses a business cycle accounting approach and regression-based
tests of risk sharing, is complementary to the labor-wedge analysis of Karabarbounis (2014b).6
The third strand of literature is exemplified by a series of papers by Enrique Mendoza and
co-authors (Mendoza et al., 1994; Mendoza and Tesar, 1998, 2005; Mendoza et al., 2013), among
many others. These papers explore tax competition in an international macroeconomic framework.
A recent contribution that is related to our work is Coeurdacier et al. (2012), who solve an optimal
capital taxation problem when capital is mobile and assets across the world are imperfect substi-
tutes. Our paper also contributes to the large empirical literature on this topic (see Slemrod, 2004;
Zodrow, 2010, for example). We provide a more complete survey of this body of work in a later
section of our paper.
Methodologically, we are closest to the recent literature on business cycle accounting pioneered
by Chari et al. (2007), as well as the older and larger literature that examines empirical measures
and tests of risk sharing. To the first, our contribution lies in introducing and documenting the
evolution of a novel measure of risk sharing in the form of the wedge between consumption growth
financial markets or strong wealth effects of domestic shocks. Since the framework from which our risk-sharing tests
are derived abstracts from both of these complications, it is not surprising that we reject the null of perfect risk sharing.
An important empirical insight from this literature is that unobserved factors influencing the measured stochastic
discount factor and omitted sources of exogenous or endogenous fluctuations can lead to misleading conclusions
about the degree of risk-sharing. Some prominent examples include exogenous preference shocks (Stockman and
Tesar, 1995), the presence of non-traded goods in the consumption bundle (Backus and Smith, 1993), non-additivity
of leisure and consumption in the utility function (Lewis, 1996), sticky prices (Chari et al., 2002), inflation differentials
(Hoffmann, 2008), and the role of expectations (Engel and Rogers, 2009). Our empirical contribution, thus, is to
explore the role that consumption and capital taxes may play as an additional source of omitted variation confounding
empirical inferences about risk sharing made off otherwise standard international macroeconomic models.
6Karabarbounis (2014b) adjusts the level of labor wedges across countries using the labor and consumption tax
data from McDaniel (2009), which we also utilize. He notes that time variation in taxes is not relevant for explaining
the cyclical properties of the labor wedge, while the level adjustment due to taxes is crucial. These findings are
analogous to our conclusions from regression-based tests of risk sharing when capital and consumption taxes are
incorporated into the benchmark IBC model, and our risk-sharing wedge analysis.
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across countries.7 To the second, we add a comprehensive analysis of a hitherto unexplored source
of country specific risk, namely consumption and capital taxes.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 integrates taxes into a standard de-
centralized IBC model and derives key testable predictions relating consumption growth rates and
taxes. Section 3 describes the data we use. Section 4 describes our regression-based methodology
and presents results. Section 5 uses a business cycle accounting measure to map the long-term
evolution of risk sharing and examines the relationship between this measure, financial integration,
and cross-country convergence in capital taxes. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory
Consider the household’s problem in the canonical single-good IBC model (see Backus et al., 1992)
augmented with taxes on consumption expenditures and asset income. The representative house-
hold in country i maximizes the discounted sum of utilities:
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtpi(st)U(Ci(s
t), Hi(s
t)),
choosing sequences {Ci(st), Hi(st), Bi(st+1|st)}∞t=0, where Ci is consumption, Hi is labor hours, Bi
is the total payoff from one-period contingent real bonds that pay out in units of the common
world final consumption good, β is the discount factor, and pi(st) is the period 0 probability of any
particular history st.9 The maximization is subject to the sequence of budget constraints
(1 + τ ci (s
t))Ci(s
t) +
∑
st+1∈S
Q(st+1|st)Bi(st+1|st) = (1− τhi (st))Wi(st)Hi(st)
+ (1− τki (st))Bi(st) + (1− τki (st))Πi(st) + Ti(st).
(1)
In the budget constraint, Wi is the wage rate, Qi(st+1|st) is the bond price, and Ti is a lump sum
transfer made by the government. The terms τ ci , τ
h
i , and τ
k
i are proportional taxes on consump-
tion expenditures, labor income, and asset income (from physical capital and contingent bonds),
7In a recent paper Backus et al. (2016) interpret wedges in frictionless IBC models as being the byproduct of
endogenous variation in Pareto weights in a model with recursive preferences.
8Since the seminal work of Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994), a vast literature testing risk
sharing at the state and country level has developed, as exemplified by Lewis (1996), Asdrubali et al. (1996), Imbs
(2006), Artis and Hoffmann (2008), Flood et al. (2012), among many others. Recent papers in this literature have
documented how the degree of risk sharing, as captured by regression-based tests, has evolved over time. The thrust
of these papers has been to reconcile the surge in financial globalization in the last two decades with the surprising
lack of evidence in favor of improved risk sharing. Explanations have centered around still existent financial frictions
and the statistical properties of underlying risks.
9We use standard notation to describe the uncertainty that creates incentives for international risk sharing. At
each time t, the economy is in state st ∈ S, where S is the set of possible states of the world. The sequence of events
until date t is denoted by the history st. A household observes the history st, and forms expectations on the future
state st+1.
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respectively.10
Since we are mainly interested in the implications of taxes on international risk-sharing – which
plays out exclusively through the asset Euler equations of the representative agent in each country
– we only focus on the first-order conditions pertaining to bonds.11 The Euler equation for the
holdings of the contingent bond in country i is given by
Q(st|st−1) = βpi(st|st−1)UCi(s
t−1, st)
UCi(st−1)
(1 + τ ci (s
t−1))
(1 + τ ci (s
t))
(1− τki (st)) ∀st. (2)
Equation 2 implies a risk-sharing condition across countries i and j that should hold for each time
t and history st. Equating the right hand side of this equation for any country pairs i and j gives
us, ∀st and i 6= j,
UCi(s
t−1, st)
UCi(st−1)
(1 + τ ci (s
t−1))
(1 + τ ci (s
t))
(1− τki (st)) =
UCj(s
t−1, st)
UCj(st−1)
(1 + τ cj (s
t−1))
(1 + τ cj (s
t))
(1− τkj (st)). (3)
We henceforth suppress the state-dependent notation in favor of time subscripts, wherever
possible, for simplicity. Assuming isoelastic preferences of the form U(Ci,t) =
C1−γi,t
1−γ , Equation 2
implies a monotone relationship between consumption growth, consumption tax growth, and capital
income taxes in country i along any equilibrium path with a given schedule of tax rates:
∆Ci,t =
1
γ
ln[
βpi(st)
Q(st)
]− 1
γ
∆(1 + τ ci,t) +
1
γ
ln(1− τki,t). (4)
Above, ∆Ai,t = ln(Ai,t)− ln(Ai,t−1) is the growth rate for any variable At pertaining to country i.
Focusing on the last two terms in Equation 4, consumption growth over the previous period is lower
with higher consumption and capital income taxes in period t. The intuition for this relationship
is as follows. Higher growth in consumption taxes between periods t − 1 and t increases the
intertemporal relative price of consumption at time t, lowering consumption growth. At the same
time, a higher capital income tax rate at time t lowers the after-tax returns to savings, thereby
reducing the incentive to shift consumption from period t− 1 to t and lowers consumption growth.
10Note that the capital tax is imposed on the asset income Bi(s
t) from bonds and not on the value of bond
holdings
∑
st+1∈SQ(st+1|s
t)Bi(st+1|st). We assume that profits, Πi(st) from the ownership of physical capital are
taxed at the same capital income tax rate at the firm level and that firms take it into account when making their
dividend payments. This assumption is meant as a realistic simplification (further details are given later, when we
describe the tax data that we use to operationalize the model). The household takes the optimal after-tax dividend
(1 − τki (st))Πi(st) as given in its budget constraint. Thus the capital tax influences the household’s problem only
through its decision on how many contingent bonds to buy. An alternative is to assume that households make the
capital accumulation decision themselves and rent it out to firms at the capital rental rate. This specification leaves
our main risk-sharing equation unchanged. See the supplementary appendices for details.
11The optimality conditions for the firm’s problem, or investment and labor taxes are not directly relevant to the
derivation of the cross-country risk-sharing conditions and are hence omitted for conciseness. All our conclusions are
robust to the inclusion of these other taxes in the analysis (see an earlier draft of this paper, Epstein et al., 2014, for
additional details).
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Both effects are proportional to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1γ . In the absence
of taxes, Equation 4 implies that consumption growth in country i should not be influenced by
idiosyncratic country risk. This observation forms the basis of the tests of risk sharing we implement
later.12
Equation 3, in turn, implies the following relationship between consumption growth for any pair
of countries i and j:
∆Ci,t −∆Cj,t = −1
γ
[∆(1 + τ ci,t)−∆(1 + τ cj,t)] +
1
γ
[ln(1− τki,t)− ln(1− τkj,t)]. (5)
Equation 5 says that in the absence of taxes or when tax regimes coincide (in terms of growth
rates of consumption taxes and levels of capital taxes), countries should have the same growth
rate of consumption. This corresponds to the definition of perfect risk sharing, or the prediction
of perfectly correlated consumption growth rates, of the benchmark IBC model. However, when
tax regimes are unequal the country with relatively low consumption tax growth or capital tax
level enjoys higher consumption growth. Intuitively, differences in consumption tax growth affect
the implicit relative prices of consumption across countries, while differences in asset income taxes
create further incentives to deviate from equalization of consumption growth rates. Equation 5
formalizes the intuition behind the example provided in the introduction. As in Equation 4, the
effects of both taxes are proportional to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1γ .
13
From a business cycle accounting perspective, Equation 3 can be written for countries i and
j as a “risk-sharing wedge” that captures the extent to which, in levels, the tax-inclusive model’s
risk-sharing condition fails to hold empirically. This risk-sharing wedge approach is akin to the
business cycle accounting framework (see Chari et al., 2007) used in recent papers, such as Prescott
(2004), Gali et al. (2007), Ohanian et al. (2008), McDaniel (2011), and Karabarbounis (2014a,b),
to study the behavior of the labor wedge (the extent to which the marginal rate of substitution of
consumption for leisure differs from the marginal product of labor) across time. To the best of our
knowledge, the implementation of this approach with consumption and capital taxes in the context
of international risk sharing is a novel contribution of our paper.
Taking the ratio of the left and right hand sides of Equation 3, we define three “risk-sharing
wedges” between countries i and j at time t as follows. The all-tax-inclusive risk-sharing wedge is
defined as
ΓijA,t ≡
UCi,t
UCi,t−1
(1+τci,t−1)
(1+τci,t)
(1− τki,t)
UCj,t
UCj,t−1
(1+τcj,t−1)
(1+τcj,t)
(1− τkj,t)
, (6)
12In addition, consumption growth also depends on the ratio pi(s
t)
Q(st)
that summarizes aggregate, undiversifiable risk,
as well as a time-invariant component determined by the discount factor β. Ceteris paribus, higher β or more patience
implies higher consumption growth.
13We assume that consumption and labor are separable in the utility functions. We consider non-additive labor in
the supplementary appendices. Our results are insensitive to this feature of the model for reasons explained in that
appendix.
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the consumption-tax-inclusive wedge is defined as
ΓijC,t ≡
UCi,t
UCi,t−1
(1+τci,t−1)
(1+τci,t)
UCj,t
UCj,t−1
(1+τcj,t−1)
(1+τcj,t)
, (7)
and the baseline wedge (without any taxes) defined as
ΓijB,t ≡
UCi,t
UCi,t−1
UCj,t
UCj,t−1
, (8)
where the “A”, “B”, and “C” subscripts in Γijt stand for “all-tax-inclusive”, “baseline” and “consumption-
tax-inclusive”, respectively. While ΓijA,t and Γ
ij
C,t arise from our analysis, Γ
ij
B,t is a product of the
canonical (or baseline) model of international risk sharing without taxes.
In contrast to the canonical model, once taxes are accounted for perfect international risk sharing
need not imply equalization of consumption growth rates. Indeed, note that if the theoretical risk-
sharing condition implied by the model in levels holds exactly at every point in time between
countries i and j, then ΓijA,t = 1 ∀t. On the other hand, in the context of the canonical model (i.e.,
absent taxes) Equation 8 implies that if there is perfect risk sharing then ΓijB,t = 1 holds. Therefore,
assuming isoelastic utility, to the extent that the tax-inclusive model is correct, then ΓijA,t = 1 6= ΓijB,t
implies that perfect risk sharing between countries (ΓijA,t = 1) is not necessarily inconsistent with
the growth rate of consumption between these two countries being different (ΓijB,t 6= 1).
A clarifying comment on our measure of risk sharing, ΓijA,t, is helpful. In this measure, the ratio
of marginal utilities is scaled by the various taxes present in the model. Notice that we would
derive a similar expression if we were to consider scaling shocks to utility (for instance shocks to
the discount factors), in which case the ratio of marginal utilities would be scaled by the preference
shocks. This parallel raises the question of the correct measure of risk sharing. If we were to consider
preference shocks, then the scaled ratios of marginal utilities clearly are the relevant measure that a
planner would consider. Things are more subtle when considering taxes. As taxes are not structural
preferences but instead a source of distortions, a social planner unconstrained in the tools at her
disposal would aim for perfect risk sharing without distortions, which corresponds to the measure
ΓijB,t = 1. If, however, the planner cannot affect the taxes she aims for constrained risk sharing that
corresponds to the measure ΓijA,t = 1.
3 Data
We focus our analysis on 15 OECD countries for which extensive time series data on taxes (dis-
cussed below) are available: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
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Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Fur-
thermore, because time series data on taxes are only available at yearly frequency, our analysis is
at that frequency as well. In particular, given limitations on the availability of time series data on
taxes, our analysis spans the years 1960 through 2010 for all countries except Australia and Japan.
For these two countries the analysis spans 1960 through 2008 per the availability of tax data.
We use data from various sources in order to operationalize the model. Publicly available
cross-country data on consumption, output, and the working-age population (ages 15-64) are taken
from the OECD.14 In particular, the data on consumption and output is from the OECD database
VPVOBARSA (this is the OECD acronym for data in volume estimates, fixed purchasing power
parities, OECD reference year 2005, annual levels, seasonally adjusted in millions of US dollars).
In all the analyses that follow, we work with per capita consumption and output by normalizing
these series using each country’s respective working age population.15
Our country-specific consumption and capital tax data are from McDaniel (2009) and publicly
available on her website.16 These average tax rates are calculated using national accounts data and a
methodology analogous to that used by Mendoza et al. (1994) and Carey and Rabesona (2002).17 In
broad terms, the consumption tax rate is derived as the ratio of government revenue collected from
consumption to total taxable consumption expenditures (household final consumption expenditure
net of revenue collected from taxes levied on consumption expenditure). The capital tax rate is
the ratio of government revenue from taxing capital (the sum of total capital tax revenue collected
from households, direct taxes on corporations, and the share of taxes on production and imports
that represents property taxes paid by entities other than households) to capital taxable income
(the capital-share weighted difference between gross domestic product and taxes on production
and imports minus subsidies, net of gross operating surplus earned by the government). Adding
gross operating surplus earned by the government back into the measure of capital taxable income
delivers a measure of the sum of operating surplus earned by corporations, the capital share of
operating surplus earned by private unincorporated enterprises, and operating surplus earned by
the government.18
14Available at stats.oecd.org.
15Our conclusions remain unchanged if we use total instead of per capita consumption and output. These results
are not reported.
16The tax series are available at www.caramcdaniel.com.
17In representative agent contexts, Mendoza et al. (1994) suggest that average tax rates derived from national
accounts can be useful to represent the marginal tax rates faced by a representative agent. Several papers by Enrique
Mendoza and his coauthors have utilized tax data in calibrated dynamic models of international tax competition
(Mendoza and Tesar, 1998, 2005; Mendoza et al., 2013). Recent papers such as Karabarbounis (2014b) and Ragan
(2013) have used the data from McDaniel (2009).
18See McDaniel (2009) for a more detailed description on the calculation of each tax rate.
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3.1 Measures of Financial Integration
For reasons detailed later in the paper, we make use of three measures of financial integration.
The first two of these measures span the years 1970 through 2010 and are fairly standard. One of
them is the Chinn-Ito index of de jure financial openness that is described in detail in Chinn and
Ito (2006). The second one is a measure of the financial openness of a country constructed using
data on total foreign assets and liabilities from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Following a large
literature, the financial openness ratio of country i to the rest of the world at time t, INTi,t, is
defined as:
INTi,t ≡ FORASSETSi,t + FORLIABSi,t
Yi,t
, (9)
the ratio of the sum of total foreign assets (FORASSETSi,t) and foreign liabilities (FORLIABSi,t)
to GDP (Yi,t).
19
Another portion of our analysis uses a third bilateral measure of financial integration constructed
using data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In particular, for all countries in
our sample we use locational data on the external positions of reporting banks vis-a`-vis individual
countries and vis-a`-vis all sectors. These data are in millions of US dollars and reveal the amount
of banking financial claims of one country over another. These BIS data are available publicly on
their website, but only for a relatively short time horizon at the time of writing.20 However, we
are able to access confidential data from the BIS on bilateral financial claims for a majority of
each of the years 1978 through 2010 for the pairwise country combinations in our analysis. We use
these data in conjunction with the publicly available cross-country data on nominal GDP from the
OECD database CPCARSA (this is the OECD acronym for millions of US dollars, current prices,
current purchasing power parities, annual levels, seasonally adjusted) to construct bilateral indices
of financial integration for the countries in our analysis.
We use the BIS data to construct a measure of bilateral de facto financial connectedness. This
measure, which we henceforth refer to as Fij,t, is equal to the sum of financial claims of banks
resident in country i over country j (fi→j,t), and financial claims of banks resident in country j
over country i (fj→i,t), divided by the sum of these countries’ nominal GDP (Yi,t and Yj,t):
Fij,t ≡ fi→j,t + fj→i,t
Yi,t + Yj,t
. (10)
In line with the rest of the data used in our paper, this ratio is at yearly frequency. Furthermore,
the fact that in currency terms this ratio is unitless allows us to use it within analyses involving
real variables. More motivation for our index of bilateral financial integration is provided in a later
19All three variables are measured in current USD. The two stock variables in the denominator are measured as
of Dec 31 and hence converted to USD at the end-of-period exchange rate, while GDP in current USD is converted
from domestic currency using the period-average exchange rate. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for more details.
20At http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm.
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section. Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Tables 1 and 2 in the supplementary
appendices.
4 Taxes and Consumption Growth
In this section, we investigate whether the structural relationship implied by our theory exists in the
data and if it affects regression-based tests of risk sharing. In particular, we use Equations 4 and 5,
that relate consumption growth to taxes, to derive two alternative regression-based tests following
Lewis (1996). Both of these regression-based tests exploit the idea that the asset Euler equations
as well as the risk-sharing conditions between country pairs place restrictions on the estimated
coefficients in a regression of country i’s consumption growth, or their difference, on idiosyncratic
country variables.
We allow for an unobserved preference shock bi,t in country i, so that utility for consumption
in country i is U(Ci,t) = bi,t
C1−γi,t
1−γ , as well as a country fixed effect, αi, to pick up time-invariant
country characteristics. Replacing the state notation with a subscripted t, Equation 4 can then be
rewritten as
∆Ci,t = αi + αt + θ1∆(1 + τ
c
i,t) + θ2ln(1− τki,t) + ψXi,t + i,t (11)
where i,t =
1
γ∆bi,t + 
′
i,t is a composite error term. The term αt, which depends on the asset price
Q(st), and hence aggregate world consumption at time t (see Equation 4), can be interpreted as a
time fixed effect in a country-year panel regression. Xi,t is a country i specific idiosyncratic variable.
The economic interpretation of Equation 11 is that the consumption of an individual country
depends on aggregate world consumption (which is equal to aggregate world output) but not on
idiosyncratic country variables. The implication is that ψ = 0 for any time varying idiosyncratic
country i variable Xi,t not appearing directly in the Euler equation.
Similarly, Equation 5 can be rewritten as:
∆Ci,t −∆Cj,t = αij + θ′1[∆(1 + τ ci,t)−∆(1 + τ cj,t)] + θ
′
2[ln(1− τki,t)− ln(1− τkj,t)]
+ψ
′
[Xi,t −Xj,t] + ij,t,
(12)
where αij is a country pair fixed effect, and ij,t =
1
γ [∆bi,t−∆bj,t]+
′
ij,t is a composite error term.
21
Perfect risk-sharing then implies ψ
′
= 0.
We take logarithms of the yearly series for per capita consumption and gross consumption tax
rates and time-difference to construct the data for estimating Regressions 11 and 12. The capital
tax rate is used in its logarithms without taking its time difference, corresponding to the derived
21An earlier draft of this paper (Epstein et al., 2014) showed that the fixed effects αi and αij can be explicitly
derived from Equations 4 and 5 if we allow for time-invariant differences across countries, such as different discount
rates. For example, in the case of different discount rates βi and βj in countries i and j, the fixed effects can be
represented as αi =
1
γ
ln[βi] and αij =
1
γ
(
ln[βi]− ln[βj ]
)
.
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structural equations. The idiosyncratic country risk variable Xi,t in our benchmark regressions is
per capita GDP growth in country i between periods t−1 and t. Note that the coefficients of interest
in both these regressions would remain unchanged if instead we used the deviation of national per
capita GDP growth from world per capita GDP growth (as is customary in this literature), due to
the time fixed effect in Equation 11 (which absorbs world GDP growth in period t) and the country
differencing of contemporaneous variables in Regression 12 (where world GDP growth cancels out).
4.1 Benchmark Results: 1960-2010
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the results from estimating Regressions 11 and 12, and show that the
empirical relevance of the tax-inclusive theory is supported by the data. Estimation of Equation
12 requires us to choose a benchmark country j for each country i. In the spirit of standard IBC
analysis, for instance Backus et al. (1992), where results are presented with the United States as
the benchmark country that interacts with “the rest of the world” we set the United States as
country j. Thus, in the following sentences “relative” refers to the average country i relative to the
United States.22
Note from the second row of Tables 2 and 3, columns 2 and 4, that the coefficient on consumption
tax growth and relative consumption tax growth have the sign predicted by the expressions in
Equations 4 and 5, respectively, regardless of whether capital taxes are included in the regressions.
That is, an increase in domestic consumption tax growth is associated with lower consumption
growth in Table 2, and the same is true for relative quantities in Table 3. While the log-level of
capital taxes has the wrong sign in Table 2 (third row, columns 3 and 4), it is not statistically
significant. However, the difference in the log-level of capital taxes across countries has the correct
sign in Table 3 (third row, columns 3 and 4) and is statistically significant, implying that an
increase in relative capital income taxes (which reduces 1 − τk in relative terms) reduces relative
consumption growth.23 As is the case with the consumption tax, in the case of the capital tax
the point estimates are roughly the same whether the consumption tax is included or not in the
regression.
The estimated marginal effect of per capita GDP growth is larger than the marginal effects
of a change in the growth rate of the consumption tax and the level of the capital tax. To get a
sense of their relative magnitudes, we use the coefficient estimates from Tables 2 and 3, along with
the standard deviations of the corresponding variables (reported in Table 1 of the supplementary
appendices) to make some back-of-the-envelope calculations. A one standard deviation increase
22Alternative choices of benchmark countries as well as using all possible country pairs leaves the conclusions from
our regressions unchanged.
23We perform panel unit root tests for all the series, which are found to be stationary with the exception of the
capital tax rate which enters Equation 11 in its logarithms without differencing (as used in the regression corresponding
to Table 2). Thus the negative and insignificant coefficient on the log-level in Table 2 should in any case be interpreted
with caution. However the difference of capital taxes across a country pair, which enters Equation 12 is stationary
(as used in the regression corresponding to Table 3).
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in per capita GDP growth is associated with a nearly a 0.8 standard deviation increase in per
capita consumption growth. In comparison, a one standard deviation increase in ∆(1 + τ c) is
associated with only a 0.06 standard deviation decline in per capita consumption growth. In turn,
a one standard deviation increase in relative per capita GDP growth is roughly consistent with a
0.75 standard deviation increase in relative per capita consumption growth. In comparison, one
standard deviation increases in relative ∆(1+τ c) and ln(1−τk) are associated with, respectively, a
0.09 standard deviation decline and increase in per capita consumption growth. These calculations
show that per capita GDP growth explains much more of the variability in per capita consumption
growth than do taxes.
All told, regardless of issues pertaining to relative magnitudes, we conclude that consumption
growth responds predictably to the growth rate of consumption taxes and the log level of capital
taxes as implied by our theory. Since a large literature, surveyed in detail later, points to tax rates
being related to international financial integration through the mechanism of tax competition, we
next consider whether these empirical results are robust to controlling for different measures of
financial integration.
4.2 The Role of Financial Integration (1970-2010 and 1978-2010)
International financial integration is perfect by definition in our theoretical complete markets model.
In reality, countries are imperfectly financially integrated with each other and their degree of
integration has varied over our sample period in both de jure (see Chinn and Ito, 2006) and de
facto (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) terms. We show in an appendix that the relationship
between consumption growth and taxes predicted by the theory also holds (in expected values) when
financial markets are incomplete. Since the degree of financial integration is arguably a proxy for
the degree of market completeness at the international level, our results should therefore hold for all
levels of financial integration, and not controlling for it in our regressions is not a major concern in
this respect. However, a large literature in public finance and international macroeconomics, which
we detail later in the paper, suggests that tax rates should be correlated with financial integration
with causality running in both directions. Since risk sharing ought to be directly influenced by the
degree of financial integration, taxes in our benchmark results could just be acting as a proxy for
financial integration. We thus test the sensitivity of the benchmark results of the previous section
to controlling for financial integration.
To do so, we use two of the three measures of financial integration described earlier as individual
regressors and interacted with our measures of idiosyncratic risk:
∆Ci,t = αi + αt + θ1∆(1 + τ
c
i,t) + θ2ln(1− τki,t) + ψ1Xi,t + ψ2INTi,t + ψ3Xi,t × INTi,t + i,t (13)
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∆Ci,t −∆Cj,t = αij + θ′1[∆(1 + τ ci,t)−∆(1 + τ cj,t)] + θ
′
2[ln(1− τki,t)− ln(1− τkj,t)]
+ψ
′
1[Xi,t −Xj,t] + ψ
′
2Fij,t + ψ
′
3[Xi,t −Xj,t]× Fij,t + ij,t.
(14)
These specifications are similar in spirit to Lewis (1996) and much of the subsequent empirical
literature on risk sharing. Since Equation 13 tests the sensitivity of the consumption growth rate
of a single country to idiosyncratic shocks vis-a`-vis the rest of the world, we use INTi,t, which
measures the financial openness of a country to the rest of the world. This series is available
for the years 1970-2010. For Equation 14, which is in bilateral terms, we use our measure of
bilateral financial connectedness Fij,t, which is only available for the years 1978-2010. The results
are reported in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. For comparison with the benchmark results, Table 2
should be compared to Table 4, and Table 3 should be compared to Table 5.
In comparing results, it should be kept in mind that the sample periods for the regressions differ
due to the availability of our financial integration measures. In particular, while the benchmark
tables use data from 1960-2010, Tables 4 and 5 use data from 1970-2010 and 1978-2010 respectively.
For Equation 13, the fourth row of Table 4 (columns 2 and 4) shows that the results for the
consumption tax are consistent in sign (and roughly magnitude) with Table 2, but these coefficients
are not significant at conventional levels. In turn, the fifth row of Table 4 (columns 3 and 4) shows
that the log level of the gross capital tax rate is also of the same sign as in the corresponding
benchmark case shown in Table 2 (and roughly of the same magnitude). Recall that the negative
sign of this coefficient is the opposite of what is predicted by the theory, but these point estimates
were not statistically significant in the benchmark case (Table 2), while in Table 4 these point
estimates are indeed significant but only at the 10% level. In turn, comparing results between
Table 3 and Table 5: the sign and significance of the consumption tax are consistent with each
other as well as with the predictions of the theory; and capital taxes are of the correct sign and
significant in Table 3 while they are of the incorrect sign but insignificant in Table 5. The analysis
implies that the results pertaining to capital taxes are the most sensitive when financial integration
is controlled for. This is consistent with the well-known idea in public finance that capital taxes
are strongly influenced by the process of financial integration.
While the financial openness measure is itself significant in all the specifications, it does not have
a clear interpretation in the framework of risk-sharing regressions. The interaction term with our
idiosyncratic risk measure, however, does: If financial openness led to more risk sharing, this should
show up as a negative and significant interaction term. While the interaction coefficient estimate
is indeed negative it is not statistically significant. This result is consistent with the findings of the
large literature on the (lack of) international risk sharing surveyed in Kose et al. (2009).
4.3 Discussion
The overall picture that emerges from our analysis is that the relationship between consumption
growth and taxes predicted by the theory holds in the data: Fluctuations in taxes lead to predictable
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changes in consumption growth within and between countries. In particular, countries with lower
consumption tax growth rates or capital tax levels relative to the United States (as noted before,
the choice of benchmark country does not affect our results), enjoy significantly higher consumption
growth on average. Thus, the simple inclusion of taxes improves the fit to the data of the benchmark
model of international risk sharing.
The predictable variations in consumption growth induced by taxes, however, turn out to be
small when compared to those induced by idiosyncratic shocks to per capita output. In other
words, the international risk sharing puzzle remains in this case, since taxes do not explain much of
the variance in consumption growth both within and across countries, in comparison to per capita
GDP growth.
Given the results thus far, we conclude that since taxes are a statistically significant determinant
of consumption growth and its differentials across countries, they should be controlled for when
evaluating the performance of individual theories or frictions that purport to explain international
risk sharing. Of note, in terms of point estimates, Table 4 suggested an intuitive relationship
between international financial integration and improved risk sharing. Accordingly, in what follows,
we use the business cycle accounting framework that allows us to derive risk-sharing wedges in order
to further explore the relationship between financial integration and risk sharing.
5 Financial Integration, Taxes, and the Evolution of Risk Sharing
As noted in our earlier discussion, from a business cycle accounting perspective, Equations 6, 7
and 8 are informative about the level of risk sharing between countries, and thus can be used to
chart the evolution of risk sharing over time. Since taxes distort risk sharing at each point in time,
this issue is related to, but also in itself of separate interest relative to, the impact of taxes on
consumption growth rates that is the standard metric of the average degree of risk sharing over
time. In the spirit of the labor wedges literature (for instance Prescott, 2004; Ohanian et al., 2008;
McDaniel, 2011) we start with a graphical analysis of the evolution of risk sharing over time. To
do so, we plot our measures ΓijB,t, Γ
ij
C,t, and Γ
ij
A,t from 1960 onwards, operationalizing the wedges
using isoelastic preferences of the form U(Ci) =
C1−γi
1−γ . We use a value of γ = 2, which is the value
that Backus et al. (1992), among many others, use in their benchmark calibration. Furthermore,
in all cases, we take the United States as country j per the notation in Equations 6-7. As before,
the choice of the United States as country j is in the spirit of standard IBC analysis.
The dashed black line in Figure 1 plots the risk-sharing wedge for all countries assuming away
all taxes. This is the baseline risk-sharing wedge, ΓijB,t, that is the focus of canonical models of
international risk sharing. In all cases, this risk-sharing wedge generally oscillates about 1, which
suggests that in level terms the baseline wedge derived from the canonical model’s risk-sharing
condition has been trendless while being subject to relatively short lived deviations (in some cases,
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though, of considerable magnitude) around unity. The solid blue line in Figure 1 plots the risk-
sharing wedge with “consumption taxes only”, ΓijC,t, yielding similar conclusions as the case in which
consumption taxes are omitted. We conclude that without controlling for taxes, or controlling only
for consumption taxes, risk-sharing wedges generally oscillate around 1. The implication from these
graphs is that international risk sharing has not improved over time, which is consistent with the
accepted wisdom that risk sharing measured by consumption correlations or risk-sharing regression
coefficients has not been improved by the large increases in financial integration that took place over
the last several decades. At the risk of oversimplifying the conclusions of a voluminous literature,
this failure has generally been interpreted as there not being enough financial integration (see Bai
and Zhang, 2012; Bengui et al., 2013) or volatility in the current account (Bai and Zhang, 2010) to
achieve perfect risk sharing period by period.
In turn, Figure 2 again plots the risk-sharing wedge for each country (the solid black lines,
measured on the left vertical axes), but now accounting for both capital and consumption taxes,
i.e., ΓijA,t (defined in Equation 6). For illustration, it also plots the commonly used Chinn-Ito index
(see Chinn and Ito, 2006, 2008) of de jure financial openness of a country, but as a ratio of its
value for the United States (the dashed green lines, measured on the right vertical axes). The
difference compared to the no-tax and consumption-tax-only cases depicted in Figure 1 is stark.
Indeed, inspection of Figure 2 shows that in all cases except Germany and Japan the tax-inclusive
risk-sharing wedge broadly exhibits a trend decline across countries. In particular, over time risk-
sharing wedges generally approach unity from above. At the same time, the relative Chinn-Ito
index has generally risen across countries. One interpretation of Figure 2 is that at the same time
that countries’ overall financial openness has risen, risk sharing of all other countries in our sample
with the United States has risen as implied by the behavior of the full risk-sharing wedge.24 In
contrast, absent taxes and, in particular, absent capital taxes (Figure 1) the risk-sharing condition
would suggest that financial liberalization is largely irrelevant for the long-term evolution of risk
sharing. Thus, controlling for taxes, and especially capital taxes, appears to be important for a
correct assessment of trends in risk sharing relative to trends in financial openness.
How have capital taxes affected the decline in risk-sharing wedges? One possible answer to this
question, which emerges from our previous discussion, is purely mechanical: The decline in the
risk-sharing wedge reflects the convergence of capital tax rates of a majority of the large economies
of the world to that of the United States. Inspecting the expression for the all tax-inclusive wedge
ΓijA,t ≡
UCi,t
UCi,t−1
(1+τci,t−1)
(1+τci,t)
(1− τki,t)
UCj,t
UCj,t−1
(1+τcj,t−1)
(1+τcj,t)
(1− τkj,t)
,
24In terms of interpreting results, it is important to note that the Chinn-Ito index is a de jure measure of restrictions
on cross-border financial transactions compiled from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), and is not correlated with our tax series purely by construction. The Chinn-Ito
index is also a measure of overall financial openness, but not of pairwise financial connectedness as our measure Fij,t.
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and comparing Figures 1 and 2, it is clear that the downward trend in the wedges has been driven
by the term
1−τki
1−τkUS
(recall that country j is the United States). In particular, the decline in the
risk-sharing wedge must be driven by a decline of the ratio
1−τki
1−τkUS
, and hence by a decline of the
United States capital tax rate relative to the other countries in our sample. Although not shown
in the interest of brevity, operationalizing the full risk-sharing wedge using other countries in our
sample as country j does not suggest nearly as strong of a negative association between risk-sharing
wedges and overall financial openness as Figure 2 does.25 In the following section, we delve deeper
into this issue by exploring the evolution of international capital tax rates relative to the United
States, as well as other bilateral country pairs.
5.1 Financial Integration and the Evolution of Taxes
In light of our earlier findings, in this section we relate the evolution of relative international
capital tax rates to the process of international financial integration. To set the stage, we first
provide an overview of the large literature in public finance and macroeconomics that deals with
the international taxation of capital income, and its relationship with financial integration. We
then present our empirical findings and relate them to the existing literature.
5.1.1 Background
Early models of tax competition imply that in small, open economies the burden of taxation
should shift from mobile to immobile factors (see Gordon and Hines, 2002, for a survey of the
literature). Thus, to the extent that capital is freely mobile across countries, competition should
theoretically trigger a race to the bottom, where the optimal tax rate on capital is driven to zero.
Studies measuring capital mobility across countries conclude that capital is indeed mobile and
that its mobility has increased over time (Zodrow, 2010). In particular, Zodrow (2010) notes that
pre-existing barriers to capital flows have declined significantly over time due to deregulation of
financial markets and advances in technologies that helped increase capital mobility. Numerous
papers in international finance have also noted that both de facto and de jure measures of financial
openness and integration have improved in the last decades. Yet, empirically, a race to the bottom
in corporate tax rates never materialized, and, in reality, many countries derive revenue by taxing
returns to both capital and labor.
Although tax revenue from capital is not zero, many studies have found evidence that com-
petition in corporate tax rates exists (Zodrow, 2010; Devereux, 2007; Hines, 2007). These studies
often focus on declines in statutory corporate tax rates that occurred over time. For example,
Devereux et al. (2008) look at whether increased competition among OECD countries led to the
observed decline in statutory corporate tax rates during the 1980s and 1990s by developing a the-
25We provide these additional figures in the supplementary appendices.
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oretical model with testable implications regarding strategic international competition in taxes on
corporate income. They find strong evidence that countries compete over the statutory tax rate
to attract mobile profit, but only weak evidence that countries compete over the tax on capital
income in order to attract capital. More specifically, Devereux et al. (2008) argue that the empir-
ical reduction in tax rates is almost entirely explained by competition induced by the relaxation
of capital controls. Tax competition, on the other hand, appears to have had less of an impact on
average corporate tax rates (Zodrow, 2010).26 In turn, Grubert (2001) measures average corporate
tax rates using foreign taxes and net income reported on Form 5471.27 In that paper, OLS results
with changes in average corporate tax rates as the dependent variable find that small, open, and
relatively poor countries experienced the largest decline in effective tax rates on corporations.28
These results are interpreted as evidence of tax competition in average tax rates.
Earlier, and in similar spirit, Mendoza and Tesar (2005) note that the integration of European
financial markets in the early 1980s resulted in harmonized indirect taxes but large differences in
factor taxes (i.e., no race-to-the-bottom materialized). They show that such results can be explained
by a neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition subject to joint externalities of tax
policy operating through fiscal solvency, relative prices, and wealth distribution. More recently,
though, Coeurdacier et al. (2012) note that, theoretically, a race-to-the-bottom of cross-country
capital taxation depends on the very strong assumption that claims on physical capital in different
countries are perfect substitutes. Their work relaxes this assumption and leads to the result of non-
zero capital taxes in the long run. In particular, Coeurdacier et al. (2012) consider the situation in
which capital returns are stochastic and international investment portfolio decisions are endogenous.
Amid this environment of uncertainty, cross-country risk sharing implies that investors optimally
hold domestic and foreign capital stocks even if they have different expected returns net of taxes,
and governments have an incentive to finance part of their expenditures at the expense of foreign
capital holders. As a result, a race-to-the-bottom does not materialize and capital taxes remain
positive.
In addition to competition, Slemrod (2004) argues that domestic forces making corporate taxa-
tion less desirable could also be converging across countries. Slemrod investigates the relationship
between domestic factors in addition to a country’s openness on both statutory and average corpo-
rate tax rates. Openness is measured in two distinct ways: (1) trade volume relative to GDP; and
(2), following Sachs and Warner (1995), a dummy variable indicating openness. The results provide
suggestive evidence of domestic influences on corporate tax rates, namely the use of the corporate
26See Zodrow (2010) and Gordon and Hines (2002) for a more complete survey of the literature.
27Form 5471 is required by the IRS to be filed by certain US citizens and residents who are officers, directors,
or shareholders in certain foreign corporations. The Form requires the filer to report detailed information for tax-
ation purposes including, though not limited to, foreign taxes and net income. See https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i5471.pdf for more information.
28The author also reports results where changes in statutory tax rates is the dependent variable; however, as
noted in Slemrod (2004), comparable results on whether changes in statutory rates fell more so for small, open, and
relatively poor countries are not reported.
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tax rate as a backstop to the individual income tax. However, the results also provide insight into
the role of competition on corporate taxation. In pooled OLS regressions, openness is negatively
correlated with statutory rates. Although the sign remains negative when country-specific fixed
effects are included, the coefficient on openness is no longer statistically significant. For both types
of regression specifications (pooled OLS and fixed effects), no statistically significant relationship is
found to exist between openness and average corporate tax rates. The author concludes these re-
sults provide some, though not definitive, evidence on the role of competitive pressures on corporate
taxation.
Of greater direct relevance for our findings, Devereux and Loretz (2013) provide a survey of
the literature on different models of tax competition that have emerged over the past twenty
years. By relaxing the assumption of perfect competition from earlier models, a number of new
testable predictions were generated. For example, assuming asymmetric Bertrand competition as
in Bucovetsky (1991) implies that small countries set lower tax rates. On the other hand, Gordon
(1992) models competition using a Stackelberg framework in which a large country sets higher tax
rates and smaller countries react by setting tax rates up to the levels of the large country’s rate.29
Consistent with Gordon (1992), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2015) provide empirical evidence on the
particular form that global tax competition takes on by testing the existence of a Stackelberg leader,
which is assumed to be either the United States, the United Kingdom, or Germany, and followers
are assumed to be Nash competitors with one another. Reaction functions are then estimated
where the coefficients of interest provide responses with respect to the Stackelberg leader and with
respect to other Nash competitors. Overall, the authors find that European countries behaved as
if the United States was a Stackelberg leader in setting corporate taxes after the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA86), but not before. Furthermore, the evidence fails to support the United Kingdom
or Germany as Stackelberg leaders.
It follows that, in broad terms, the literature on taxation and financial openness suggests that
greater financial openness should be associated with some sort of capital tax competition and
therefore some sort of capital tax convergence, although a race to the bottom would be a special
case of such convergence. We now proceed to examine what the tax data we use from McDaniel
(2009) has to say regarding this issue.
5.1.2 Analysis on Tax Convergence
Turning now to the empirical behavior of the capital tax series that we use in our analysis, Figure
3 plots the level of the average tax rate on capital for all countries in our sample from 1960 through
2010. The figure illustrates that the United States is the only country that exhibits a strong
downward trend in capital taxes over the sample period, while all other countries generally exhibit
29Table 1 of Devereux and Loretz (2013) provides a more detailed summary of past tax competition models and
their resulting testable predictions
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rising capital tax rates. Particularly striking is the fact that over the sample period the United
States’ capital tax rate decreased from a very high rate, around 40%, to roughly 25% and by the
end of the sample period other countries’ capital tax rates are generally in line with that of the
United States. The graph thus depicts international convergence in capital tax rates, and is in
line with findings from previous literature on corporate taxes that imply the United States has
acted as a Stackelberg leader. In particular, our graphical evidence suggests that over the period in
question, capital tax rates across major advanced economies were converging to the United States
capital tax rates from below. That is, most of the countries in our sample were raising their capital
tax rate to the level of the United States.
Figure 4 shows the same phenomenon as above in a slightly different way. It plots, for the same
period, the absolute value of the capital tax rate differential between country i and the United States
(black solid line), and the absolute value of the deviation of the capital tax wedge of country i (with
respect to the United States) from unity (green dashed line). These are, respectively |τki − τkUS|
and
∣∣∣ 1−τki
1−τkUS
− 1
∣∣∣. Both of these quantities are measured on the left vertical axes. It also plots the
ratio of the Chinn-Ito index of country i to that of the United States (blue dotted line) on the
right vertical axes. Taken together, Figures 3 and 4 provide prima facie evidence that as financial
integration increased over time, a process of international capital tax rate convergence took place
amid the United States lowering its tax rate and most other countries raising their tax rates over
the period 1960-2010.
The preceding figures suggest that the early years of our sample were associated with larger
declines in the tax rate difference. To verify this visual impression, we report in Table 6 the mean
and standard deviation of the absolute value of the capital tax rate differential between country
i and j, |τki − τkj |. We do this for the United States as country j (first two columns), as well as
for all bilateral country pairs where country j is not the United States (last two columns). In the
spirit of the analysis in Slemrod (2004), these summary statistics are calculated for each five year
interval starting in 1961 and ending in 2010. The means of the tax rate suggest the following. First,
capital tax convergence has mostly been a phenomenon of the countries in our sample vis-a`-vis the
United States, not among themselves. In fact, the difference in capital tax rates between the other
countries in our sample remained quite stable over the same period. Thus, convergence to roughly
similar capital tax rates did not lead to convergence among bilateral country pairs: Such differences
were already quite low, compared to the differences between these countries and the United States
at the beginning of the sample period, and remained stable. Second, the evolution of the means
shows that the time path of capital tax convergence to the United States has been uneven. Most of
the convergence appears to have taken place in the period 1970-1985, which is consistent with the
interpretation that the United States acted as a Stackelberg leader in setting taxes on the mobile
factor of production, capital, during this period.30
30Note that this period is before TRA86, and thus our suggestive evidence does not fit the timing of United States
tax leadership found in the more elaborate empirical analysis of Altshuler and Goodspeed (2015). However, as
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Was this capital tax convergence to the United States related to the process of international
financial integration of these countries? To test this hypothesis we run a simple panel regression
similar to the specifications we estimated earlier:
τki−US,t = αi + θINT INTi,t + i,t, (15)
where αi is a country fixed effect, the dependent variable is τ
k
i−US,t = |τki −τkUS|, and the independent
variable is INTi,t, the financial integration measure derived from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
that was already used in our earlier analyses. We use this measure because it starts in 1970, whereas
our bilateral measure based on BIS data starts only in 1978 when the process of convergence was
well underway. The point estimate of θINT is -0.011, and it is statistically significant at the 1%
level.31 As noted earlier, our data indicates the process of tax convergence accelerating during the
period 1970-1985. Since the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) data only starts in 1970, we miss the
period before 1970 when capital tax differences were higher and financial integration was lower.
Thus the magnitude of this coefficient likely underestimates the effect of financial integration on
tax convergence. However the estimated effect is still economically significant: The median values
of the financial openness index in 1970 and 2010 were 0.6 and 5.5, respectively, which suggests
for the median country a predicted decline of approximately 5.4 percentage points in the capital
tax rate difference with the United States. At the same time, our regression does not control for
a number of other domestic factors affecting tax rates that might have been converging over this
period, as argued in Slemrod (2004). Nevertheless, the negative and highly statistically significant
coefficient on INTi,t provides suggestive evidence that the process of financial integration played a
role in the process of capital tax rate convergence.
Recall that our interest in the convergence of capital taxes was motivated by the trend decline
of the all-tax-inclusive risk-sharing wedge with respect to the United States as countries became
more financially integrated (Figure 2). Thus, it is interesting to ask: What does the process of
financial integration and capital tax convergence documented above imply for the behavior of the
risk-sharing wedge? Therefore, to tie the preceding analysis on capital tax convergence back to the
evolution of risk-sharing wedges, we run a regression of the following form:
|Γi,USA,t − 1| = αi + θ
′
INT INTi,t + i,t. (16)
described in detail in the earlier data section, the tax rates used in our analysis are average rates, and not statutory
rates or average marginal tax rates, which are often the focus of public finance papers on this topic. The tax rates
we use are also calculated differently than Mendoza et al. (1994) who use average (effective) tax rates (see McDaniel,
2009, 2011, for details). Such differences in construction should be kept in mind when comparing our results to
previous literature.
31We do not report the regression results in a table for brevity. The estimated point coefficient is -0.0113 with a
standard error of 0.0025, a t-statistic of -4.47 and a p-value of 0.001. The standard errors are clustered at the level
of country i.
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The dependent variable |Γi,USA,t − 1| in Equation 16 is the extent to which the all-tax-inclusive
risk-sharing wedge of country i with respect to the United States differs from its perfect-risk-
sharing value of 1. Note that since the perfect-risk-sharing value is 1, |Γi,USA,t − 1| also measures
the percentage deviation of the risk-sharing wedge from this value. The point estimate of θ
′
INT in
the above regression is -0.015, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level.32 To get a sense of
the magnitude of the effect of financial integration on the all-tax-inclusive risk-sharing wedge, we
perform the same calculation as before using the median values of the financial openness index in
1970 and 2010. The median country in our sample of 14 OECD countries is predicted to experience
a decline of approximately 7.4 percentage points in its risk-sharing wedge with the United States.
In comparison, a similar regression with the baseline wedge using |Γi,USB,t − 1| as the dependent
variable predicts a decline in the baseline wedge of approximately 1.8 percentage points. Thus,
adjusting for consumption and capital taxes, especially the latter, in the manner suggested by the
theory, suggests a decline in risk-sharing wedges that is roughly 4 times larger than the baseline
case.
5.1.3 Discussion
The analysis in this section suggests that the levels of capital taxes of OECD nations converged
to that of the United States, led primarily by declines in the United States rate and increases in
a majority of the other countries. This process of convergence took place mostly in the period
1970-1985 amid the growing internationalization and integration of the capital markets of these
countries. Some recent papers in the public finance literature, as well as our own results, are
therefore suggestive of the United States being a Stackelberg leader in the setting of capital tax
rates, which led to capital-tax convergence across countries to the United States in the context
of greater global financial openness.33 We also showed that a measure of the level of risk sharing
that accounts for capital taxes, as suggested by our structural model, registered roughly concurrent
declines. While the decline in this measure was mechanically related to capital taxes in a sense, our
model provides a sound rationale as to why such a tax adjusted measure is the correct metric to
examine when assessing international risk sharing. Financial integration therefore appears to have
been associated both with cross-country convergence of capital taxes to the United States’ capital
tax rate, and as our earlier analysis of risk-sharing wedges showed, greater levels of risk sharing
of most countries with the United States. These results corroborate our earlier regression analysis
of consumption growth, which showed taxes to be a significant determinant of international risk
sharing.
32Once again, we do not report the regression results in a table for brevity. The estimated standard error is 0.0033,
with a t-statistic of -4.64. The standard errors are clustered at the level of country i.
33This is in contrast to a special case of tax convergence, which would be a “race to the bottom” stemming from
countries engaging in a Bertrand-style capital-tax setting competition.
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6 Conclusion
This paper develops an understanding of how, and the extent to which, cross-country differences,
yearly fluctuations, and long-term trends in consumption and capital taxes matter for understanding
international risk sharing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in the literature to do
so. It is well known that, empirically, a lack of international risk sharing is substantially prevalent
in the data as measured by a lack of equalization of consumption growth rates across countries.
The degree to which such robust international risk sharing fails to manifest itself empirically is
puzzling from the point of view of a standard international business cycle model. Indeed, this
model predicts that consumption, or its growth rates, should be highly correlated across countries
when risk sharing between countries is substantial.
We examine the impact of taxes from two broad vantage points, regression-based tests and
business cycle accounting, by extending an otherwise standard international business cycle model
to account for taxes. We find that consumption growth is significantly correlated to fluctuations
in the level of capital taxes and the growth rate of consumption taxes, as predicted by our theory.
However, risk-sharing regressions suggest that taxes within and across countries explain a much
lower fraction of the variation in consumption than does output. Given these two results, we
conclude that while taxes alone cannot explain the lack of consumption insurance across countries,
they should be controlled for when evaluating the empirical performance of individual theories or
frictions that purport to explain international risk sharing, or its failure, over the business cycle.
From a more long-term business cycle accounting perspective, we derive the notion of a risk-
sharing wedge. This wedge captures the extent to which an international real business cycle model’s
risk-sharing condition fails to hold at any point in time, and therefore allows for a dynamic vantage
point of risk sharing. The inclusion of taxes in the operationalized model reveals substantial im-
provements in the degree of international risk sharing over time, especially since the late 1970s. We
find that the downward trend in the risk-sharing wedge has been largely driven by the convergence
in cross-country capital tax rates to that of the United States, where the pattern of convergence is
consistent with the United States acting as a Stackelberg leader in the setting of capital taxes. This
improvement in international risk sharing generally coincides with improvements in financial liber-
alization, which, in turn, is intimately related to the convergence in capital tax rates. Yet, we also
show that this intuitive result is virtually absent when taxes are not incorporated in the analysis.
Since different structural frictions introduced into IBC models to explain the failure of risk sharing
show up as reduced-form wedges, such theories should attempt to explain the after-tax risk-sharing
wedge and its co-evolution with financial integration. As such, we conclude that accounting for
taxes, especially capital taxes, is critical for assessing the correct degree of international risk sharing
over time.
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Table 1: Correlation of Per capita Consumption Growth Rates Across Countries
Aus Aut Bel Can Fin Fra Ger Ita Jap Nld Spa Swe Swi UK USA
Aus 1.00
Aut 0.05 1.00
Bel 0.24 0.65 1.00
Can 0.28 0.16 0.26 1.00
Fin 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.34 1.00
Fra 0.23 0.69 0.69 0.26 0.50 1.00
Ger -0.09 0.64 0.58 0.25 0.31 0.71 1.00
Ita 0.19 0.58 0.70 0.14 0.38 0.72 0.56 1.00
Jap 0.04 0.61 0.60 0.08 0.40 0.77 0.63 0.64 1.00
Nld 0.40 0.46 0.54 0.36 0.20 0.57 0.61 0.47 0.34 1.00
Spa 0.32 0.71 0.66 0.41 0.44 0.80 0.59 0.77 0.61 0.57 1.00
Swe 0.34 0.33 0.41 0.46 0.56 0.54 0.39 0.44 0.29 0.35 0.64 1.00
Swi 0.03 0.59 0.61 0.29 0.44 0.72 0.72 0.66 0.61 0.51 0.66 0.36 1.00
UK 0.23 0.15 0.31 0.46 0.40 0.33 0.15 0.26 0.32 0.19 0.39 0.32 0.31 1.00
USA 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.57 0.25 0.37 0.36 0.16 0.30 0.38 0.37 0.28 0.36 0.64 1.00
Notes: Pairwise correlations are calculated for yearly per capita country consumption growth. Data
Source: OECD.
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Figure 1: Baseline and Consumption Tax Adjusted Wedges. Data sources: OECD and McDaniel
(2009).
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Figure 2: Wedge Adjusted for All Taxes and Financial Openness. Data sources: OECD, McDaniel
(2009), and Chinn and Ito (2006)
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Figure 3: Average Capital Tax Rates 1960-2010. Data source: McDaniel (2009).
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Figure 4: Absolute Difference and Wedges (w.r.t. US) of Average Capital Tax Rates 1960-2010.
Data source: McDaniel (2009).
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Table 2: The Sensitivity of Domestic Consumption Growth to Domestic Tax Rates: Benchmark
(1960-2010)
Variable Name No Tax With τ c With τk Both τ c, τk
Xit 0.768*** 0.766*** 0.772*** 0.770***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
∆(1 + τ cit) -0.161* -0.160**
(0.08) (0.07)
ln(1− τkit) -0.013 -0.013
(0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.7476 0.7503 0.7483 0.7510
No. Obs. 745 745 745 745
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Coefficient estimates of Equation 11. Dependent variable is country consumption growth
between periods t and t− 1. Independent variables are the growth rates of per capita GDP (X) and
the gross consumption tax rate (1 + τ c), and the natural logarithm of (1− τk), where τk is the capital
income tax rate. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses. Coefficients
marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data Sources: OECD and
McDaniel (2009).
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Table 3: The Sensitivity of International Consumption Growth Differentials to International Tax
Rate Differentials: Benchmark (1960-2010)
Variable Name No Tax With τ c With τk With τ c, τk
Xit −Xjt 0.764*** 0.750*** 0.741*** 0.726***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
∆(1 + τ cit)−∆(1 + τ cjt) -0.248*** -0.255***
(0.06) (0.06)
ln(1− τkit)− ln(1− τkjt) 0.017** 0.018**
(0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.6315 0.6388 0.6364 0.644
No. Obs. 695 695 695 695
Country Pair Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No
Notes: Coefficient estimates of Equation 12. Dependent variable is the difference between country
i and j of consumption growth between periods t and t − 1. Country j is always the United States.
Independent variables are the difference between country i and j of the growth rates of per capita
GDP (X) and the gross consumption tax rate (1 + τ c), and the difference between country i and j of
the natural logarithm of (1 − τk), where τk is the capital income tax rate. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the country level, in parentheses. Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ are significant at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data Sources: OECD and McDaniel (2009).
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Table 4: The Sensitivity of Domestic Consumption Growth to Domestic Tax Rates Controlling for
Financial Integration: 1970-2010
Variable Name No Taxes With τ c With τk With τ c, τk
Xit 0.731*** 0.761*** 0.761*** 0.769*** 0.769***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
INTit -0.001** -0.001** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Xit × INTit -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
∆(1 + τ cit) -0.095 -0.092
(0.07) (0.07)
ln(1− τkit) -0.018* -0.017*
(0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.7047 0.7108 0.7120 0.7122 0.7133
No. Obs. 610 610 610 610 610
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Coefficient estimates of Equation 13. Dependent variable is country consumption growth
between periods t and t− 1. Independent variables are the growth rates of per capita GDP (X) and
the gross consumption tax rate (1 + τ c), the natural logarithm of (1 − τk), where τk is the capital
income tax rate, the measure of financial openness INTit described in the text, and its interaction
with per capita GDP growth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses.
Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Data Sources:
OECD, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and McDaniel (2009).
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Table 5: The Sensitivity of International Consumption Growth Differentials to International Tax
Rate Differentials Controlling for Financial Integration: 1978-2010
Variable Name No Taxes With τ c With τk With τ c, τk
Xit −Xjt 0.747*** 0.772*** 0.770*** 0.775*** 0.772***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Fij,t -0.119*** -0.128*** -0.126*** -0.132***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
(Xit −Xjt)× Fij,t -3.425** -3.531** -3.474** -3.560**
(1.41) (1.42) (1.43) (1.45)
∆(1 + τ cit)−∆(1 + τ cjt) -0.172*** -0.164**
(0.05) (0.06)
ln(1− τkit)− ln(1− τkjt) -0.013 -0.009
(0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.5407 0.5477 0.5526 0.5487 0.5531
No. Obs. 424 424 424 424 424
Country Pair Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No
Notes: Coefficient estimates of Equation 14. Dependent variable is the difference between country
i and j of consumption growth between periods t and t − 1. Country j is always the United States.
Independent variables are the difference between country i and j of the growth rates of per capita
GDP (X) and the gross consumption tax rate (1 + τ c), the difference between country i and j of the
natural logarithm of (1−τk), where τk is the capital income tax rate, the measure of bilateral financial
integration Fij,t described in the text, and its interaction with per capita GDP growth differentials.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses. Coefficients marked ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗
and ∗ are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Data Sources: OECD, McDaniel (2009) and
BIS.
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Table 6: Convergence of Capital Tax Rates
Abs. Diff. With US Only Abs. Diff. Excl. US
Period Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1961-1965 0.1915 0.0553 0.0655 0.0448
1966-1970 0.1960 0.0619 0.0696 0.0526
1971-1975 0.1658 0.0723 0.0808 0.0611
1976-1980 0.1231 0.0588 0.0705 0.0481
1981-1985 0.0677 0.0427 0.0635 0.0441
1986-1990 0.0627 0.0403 0.0637 0.0434
1991-1995 0.0619 0.0424 0.0644 0.0425
1996-2000 0.0675 0.0468 0.0674 0.0463
2001-2005 0.0575 0.0328 0.0639 0.0454
2006-2010 0.0641 0.0485 0.0724 0.0589
Notes: Mean and standard deviation of the absolute value of the capital
tax rate differential between country i and j, |τki −τkj |. Columns 1 and 2
for United States as country j. Columns 3 and 4 for all bilateral country
pairs where country j is not the United States. Mean and standard
deviation are calculated over bilateral country pairs and the five year
interval listed on leftmost column. Data Source: McDaniel (2009).
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